Discussion Papers no. 505
Pareto-efficient climate agreements
Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a "narrow but deep" treaty with a "broad but shallow" treaty.
Om publikasjonen
- Tittel
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Pareto-efficient climate agreements
- Ansvarlige
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Geir B. Asheim, Bjart Holtsmark
- Serie og -nummer
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Discussion Papers no. 505
- Utgiver
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Statistics Norway
- Emne
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Discussion Papers
- Antall sider
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14
- Målform
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Engelsk
- Om Discussion Papers
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Discussion papers comprise research papers intended for international journals and books. A preprint of a Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article as it may include intermediate calculations, background material etc.
Kontakt
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